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A NEW FORMULA FOR PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: XX=XY
by Susan Y. Soong*
On April 19, 1994, the Supreme Court held in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.' that peremptory
challenges based on gender are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court expanded the rule of Batson v. Kentucky,2 which prohibited race discrimination in the use of
peremptory challenges under the Equal Protection Clause. As a result of JE.B., peremptory challenges to
strike jurors on the basis of gender-related stereotypes are unconstitutional. "[Glender, like race, is an
unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality."3
This article will analyze the opinion in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB. and will consider the impact
of the decision in light of three gender constructs: formal equality theory, substantive equality theory, and
different voice theory.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondent, the State of Alabama, used peremptory challenges to strike men from a jury
hearing a paternity and child support suit in the District Court of Jackson County, Alabama. The panel of
prospective jurors was composed of twelve men and twenty-four women. Three jurors were excused for
cause, leaving ten men and twenty-three women. The State used nine of its ten peremptory strikes to
remove men from the jury and the petitioner, J.E.B.,4 used one of his strikes to remove the remaining man
from the jury. The end result was a jury composed entirely of women.5
J.E.B. objected twice, once before the jury was empaneled and once again after the judgment
against J.E.B. was entered. In both objections, J.E.B. argued that the reasoning of Batson6 and the
unconstitutionality of peremptory challenges based on race similarly prohibit peremptory challenges based
on gender. The District Court of Jackson County overruled J.E.B.'s objections, ruling that
nondiscrimination in peremptory challenges under Batson did not include gender discrimination.7 The
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the lower court's finding and the Supreme Court of Alabama
denied certiorari.' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, finding that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits peremptory challenges on the basis of gender as well as on the basis of race.9
* Susan Y. Soong is a 1994 graduate of the University at Buffalo School of Law. She is currently a staff attorney with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent court
policy or the views of any judges.
1 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
2 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
4 The petitioner, J.E.B., is the putative father in the action. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
5 114 S. Ct. at 1421-2.
6 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
7 114. S. Ct. at 1422.
8 606 So.2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), cert. denied, No. 1911717 (Ala. Oct. 23, 1992).
9 Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the majority, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg. Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy wrote separate concurring opinions. There were two dissenting opinions, one by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and another by Justice Scalia, who was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.
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ANALYSIS
I. Formal Equality Theory
The theory of formal equality mandates equal treatment of similarly situated individuals."° A
person should be treated according to his or her actual characteristics, not according to stereotypical
assumptions based on his or her gender." Formal equality insists that, in the jury selection process,
similarly situated male and female prospective jurors may not be treated differently on the basis of
gender-based stereotypes.
The decision in J.E.B. is consistent with the theory of formal equality. In the majority opinion of
JE.B., Justice Blackmun noted that there is a "promise of equality under the law ... all citizens, regardless
of race, ethnicity, or gender have the chance to take part in our democracy."' 2 In accordance with formal
equality, the majority found that gender-based stereotypes are unacceptable bases for striking a prospective
juror.
The Court considered and rejected these gender-based assumptions about jurors, presented by the
State:
[M]en otherwise totally qualified to serve upon a jury might be more
sympathetic and receptive to the arguments of a man alleged in a paternity
action to be the father of an out-of-wedlock child, while women equally
qualified to serve upon a jury might be more sympathetic and receptive to
the arguments of the complaining witness who bore the child. 3
The Court called the State's gender-based stereotypes about sympathies and receptiveness "gross
generalizations"' 4 and refused to accept them as sufficient justification for peremptory challenges.
The Court further recognized that the use of gender-based stereotypes in jury selection is especially
invidious because it perpetuates and reinforces those stereotypes." "When state actors exercise peremptory
challenges in reliance on gender stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative
abilities of men and women."' 6
JE.B. is a victory for those who advocate race-blind and gender-blind equality under the
nondiscrimination clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "[Any correlation between a juror's gender and
attitudes is irrelevant as a matter of constitutional law."' 7 A person has a right to serve on a jury and a
right to be free from peremptory strikes regardless of the stereotypes associated with that person's race or
gender. 18
10 See Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the First Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45,56-7(1990).
11 See Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985); Mary E, Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 201.
12 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
13 Brief for Respondent at 10, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (quoted in 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1426
(1994)).
114 S. Ct. at 1426.
15 KATHARmNE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW 72 (1993).
16 114 S. Ct. at 1427.
17 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
18 Peremptory strikes remain valid if based upon factors other than gender or race. The J.E.B. decision "does not imply the
elimination of all peremptory challenges." 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
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II. Beyond Formal Equality
The concern with using a formal equality framework is that it does not take into account a history
of gender that has been fraught with complications arising from misconceptions, biases, and real difference.
Substantive equality theory and different voice theory have emerged as alternatives to formal equality.
Each theory takes into account sociological and historical constructs and applies a different analysis to the
same gendered issue. As Justice O'Connor wrote in her concurring opinion in JEB., "to say that gender
makes no difference as a matter of law is not to say that gender makes no difference as a matter of fact."' 9
Because men and women are socialized in different ways in American society, definite differences exist
between them.
But can one give gendered labels to attitudes about the death penalty or automobile accident
lawsuits? Is impartiality dependent upon one's gender? Is impartiality impossible simply because everyone
has a gender? Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in JE.B. 'answered all of these questions in the
negative, yet many, including Justice O'Connor, would hesitate before answering. Differences between men
and women do exist in experience, perception, and attitude.2" Differences relied upon in peremptory strikes
are often assigned and labeled in gender terms. Substantive equality theory and different voice theory
recommend that society begin to recognize and incorporate these differences into the legal system.
A. Substantive Equality Theory
The theory of formal equality relies upon treatment, not results, for its justification. Substantive
equality theory, on the other hand, focuses on the results of treatment. 2' Therefore, an analysis of
peremptory challenges using substantive equality theory would look to the results of the treatment of jurors,
or the resulting gender representation on empaneled juries. To guarantee fair outcomes, substantive
equality theory incorporates the history of discrimination into the analysis.
The majority in J.E.B. offered examples of past discrimination against women in jury service as
evidence of outdated stereotypes. Because historically women were presumed too fragile or too easily
upset to withstand the indecencies of the courtroom, they were excluded or excused from jury service.2 In
1872, a Supreme Court opinion even invoked God and biology as the basis for excluding women from
court proceedings. 23 Stereotypes about women "as the center of home and family life, 24 persisted up until
the 1970s.
Since 1975, women have had formal equality in jury service, 2 remedying the past discrimination
that the Court referred to in J.E.B.. Under substantive equality theory, past discrimination would support
an affirmative action program based on gender for jury service to eliminate the effects of the previously
19 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20 See West, supra note 10, at 58.
21 See ELIZABETH WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1980). Women's "right to substantive equality conflicts with
their right to formal equality." Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rape Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REv.
387 (1984) (reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 487 (D. Kelly Weisberg, ed. 1993)).
22 114 S. Ct. at 1423.
23 "The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life... The paramount destiny and mission of woman [sic] are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator." Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (concurring
24 opinion).
25 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (prohibiting restrictions on jury service).
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male-dominated jury pool. The affirmative introduction of women in the jury pool would help to ease or to
reverse the history of discrimination which kept women out of jury service.
To take the analysis one step further, assume that there was a history of gender discrimination in
jury selection -- not in jury service generally, but in the actual selection process. To allow women to be in
a jury pool does not immediately put women in the jury box. Discrimination in the jury selection process
could still prevent women from actually serving on juries. Substantive equality theory dictates the use of
affirmative measures to assure women, rather than men, a place in the jury box. For instance, if there was
a venire of impartial men and impartial women26 for a trial of a male rapist, evidence of past discrimination
against women in jury selection would justify a jury comprised of all women.
The past discrimination against women in jury service could be remedied by giving women a
greater opportunity to serve as jurors. One such remedy would be to protect only women from being struck
through the use of a peremptory challenge regardless of the basis for the strike. Another remedy would be
to allow peremptory strikes against men based on gender but not against women based on gender. The
intended result of these remedies would be to achieve a balance of genders in impartial juries.
The application of substantive equality to jury selection and peremptory challenges can exist in
theory only. The realities of the population of a community, the composition of a jury pool, and the
unpredictable nature of impartiality and bias combine to form a formidable obstacle to equal gender
representation on juries under substantive equality theory. Most importantly, as the majority opinion in
JE.B. emphasized, formal equality dominates current constitutional analysis to the exclusion of alternative
theories such as substantive equality-.
B. Different Voice Theory
Different voice theory recognizes that women have been socialized in a particular way in this
culture, which results in a unique perspective upon social issues.27 The difference between the way men
view the world and the way women view the world necessitates a recognition and incorporation of this
difference into the legal system. This variation in viewpoint is ironically the exact type of difference that
Justice Blackmun and the majority in J.E.B. would condemn and label "invidious group stereotypes."" In
direct conflict with formal equality theory, different voice theory seeks to embrace, acknowledge, and even
reinforce gender-based difference.
Justice O'Connor tried unsuccessfully to incorporate different voice theory into her concurring
opinion in JE.B.. She cited studies (and her ungendered intuition) which found definite attitudinal
differences between genders on issues relevant to a jury. For instance, a study found empirically that
"female jurors are somewhat more likely to convict than male jurors" in rape cases.29 Justice O'Connor
also noted that "in certain cases a person's gender and resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her
view of the case."3  A tension then arises between Justice O'Connor's attempt to acknowledge the gender
26 A guarantee of impartiality, objectivity, or neutrality is impossible, considering that every prospective juror is affected in
some way by society, through personal experience, or by the mass media. See Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's
Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 886 (1989) (reprinted
in FEMmJIsT LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 571 (D. Kelly Weisberg, ed. 1993) ).
27 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DiRENT VOICE (1982). See also Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.CHI. L. REv. 1, 14-18
(1988); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L. J. 1373, 1380-4 (1986).
28 114 S. Ct. at 1427.
29 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (citing R. Hastie, S. Penrod & N. Pennington, INSIDE THE JURY 140-1 (1983)).
30 114 S. Ct. at 1432.
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stereotypes about jurors and her vote with the majority to prohibit discrimination based on those
stereotypes.
Justice O'Connor tried to appease this tension by making the prohibition on gender discrimination
in peremptory challenges applicable only to state actors and not to criminal defendants and private civil
litigants. However, she failed to recognize the very differences about which she purports to be concerned.
The variable application of nondiscrimination in jury selection does not recognize the differences between
male jurors and female jurors. Under the different voice theory, it is illogical to allow a public defender to
recognize gender-based attitudes and, at the same time, prohibit a state prosecutor from recognizing similar
gender-based attitudes. Such gender-based attitudes should be acknowledged from the outset and should be
allowed as a basis for peremptory challenges by every lawyer. Therefore, the fact that female jurors are
more prone to convict in rape cases should be allowed as an explanation for a peremptory strike against a
female juror by the defense and as an explanation for a peremptory strike against a male juror by the
prosecution.
Unexpectedly, an analysis under different voice theory might resemble part of the reasoning by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in their dissents. Rather than using the framework of formal
equality and paying "obeisance to the equality of the sexes,"3 1 different voice theorists might prefer to adopt
Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, that "[t]he two sexes differ, both biologically and, to a diminishing extent,
in experience. It is not merely 'stereotyping' to say that these differences may produce a difference in
outlook which is brought to the jury room."32  Under the different voice theory, therefore, peremptory
challenges based on a prospective juror's gender, found unconstitutional under J E.B., would be acceptable.
CONCLUSION
Decisions such as J.E.B. invariably spark inconsistent reactions, harsh words of criticism coupled
with celebratory words of justice done.33 There is no universal consensus on how and where equality
between the sexes should be realized.
Formal equality theory, substantive equality theory, and different voice theory are all valid
frameworks for analyzing the rights and positions of men and women in America's democracy. All three
theories contribute to the developing gender history, and analysis of gender issues in light of the three
theories highlights the successes and the shortcomings of current constitutional analysis. There is no doubt
that gender issues in the future, through the use of various theoretical frameworks, will continue to
underscore the complexity of gender history and gender relations.
31 114 S. Ct. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
33 Compare, for example, newspaper articles on the J.E.B. decision. See Bruce Fein, Engendering juries by PC, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1994 at A16 (the opinion "bugle[s] the currently fashionable view that men and women are
interchangeable") and George Will, Court Foolish to Bar Sex as Jury Factor, HouSTON CHRONICLE, Apr. 26, 1994 at A16
(characterizing the majority opinion as "flimsy" and "foolish"). Cf. Equality in the Jury Box, ST. Louis DISPATCH, Apr. 25,
1994 at 6B ("Until a nation can look beyond race, gender, age, or any factors that breed prejudice and inequality, its
residents will not be truly free. The Supreme Court's latest ruling is a welcome step towards that goal") and FairerJuries,
Male and Female, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1994 at 24 (gender-based discrimination in peremptory challenges "offends the
dignity of the potential juror and threatens an injustice to the contestants").
